Since the emergence of the commercial web in the 1990’s, advertising has been the key revenue model behind most web startups including many of the biggest pure-play internet “winners.” With each economic downturn many pundits [and investors] argue that advertising is dead and instead encourage companies to focus on subscription or other direct consumer payment models (e.g., virtual currency-based transactions). So what’s the right answer? When is advertising the right model and when should a firm extract revenue from a user directly?
In many web businesses, the consumer gets content at no direct cost and is subsidized by advertising. In this post I will refer to the content side of the business as “audience” and the revenue generating side as “advertiser.” So Google Search and Yahoo! Mail are “audience” properties, for example, while AdWords and Yahoo! Search Marketing cover the “advertiser” side.
Economics 101: Allocative Efficiency.
Figure 1 shows the model of perfect competition — the point at which the supply and demand curves intersect and yield maximum aggregate surplus (consumer + producer surplus). Economists define a consumer surplus as the value consumers would pay above actual market price (the blue area under the demand curve). Producer surplus is the value above the marginal cost of production (the pink area above the supply curve). The point at which these two curves intersect is the equilibrium point, which is also known as “perfect competition” and is generally held [by economists] as the goal for all markets. My view is that Joseph Schumpeter’s vision of innovation driven by sequential monopolies (“creative destruction”) is a better model for long-term innovation, but I digress…
Figure 1: Traditional Supply and Demand Curve

Moore’s Law and “The Audience” Supply Curve.
The canonical example of a supply curve illustrated in Figure 1 assumes that the marginal cost per unit of supply increases with respect to quantity. The producer runs out of fertile soil (agriculture) or the marginal cost of materials increases as quantity increases (inputs for manufacturing, including materials and labor — e.g., overtime).
What if marginal cost approaches zero? That is, what if the supply curve approaches zero as I have depicted in Figure 2? While the variable cost of software distribution is clearly near zero, people are often quick to point out the economic maxim that “over the long run, all costs are variable.” In other words, fixed costs (like buying and running servers and storage, hiring people to write code, and owning buildings for employees to do their work) should really be amortized and added to variable costs in which case marginal cost is far from zero. But Moore’s Law, open source software, and globalization are driving the fixed costs of operating and capital expenses [on a unit amortized basis] to zero, too. In the race between mankind’s ability to consume online services and content and Moore’s Law, Moore’s Law wins hands-down.
Figure 2: The Audience Supply and Demand Curve

In Figure 2, the supply curve favors gravity over traditional economic logic and approaches zero as quantity approaches infinity. This is why it’s so hard to charge a consumer for web services and explains the dominance of advertising supported services for information-based web properties and why it appears as if 100% of the surplus accrues to consumers (blue area under the demand curve).
In certain cases information-based properties can have their cake and it it too — offer a free product to the majority of users and charge a small percentage of users a premium (the freemium model has been put to good use by eFax, LogMeIn, and Skype). This is particularly true when marginal cost isn’t zero (SkypeOut likely has a variable or semi-varaible cost) or when the audience property has a monopoly on valuable proprietary content (MLB, NHL video packages), but can also apply in other areas where the demand curve is steep *and* some switching costs do exist (Yahoo! Fantasy Football).
It will also be interesting to see how effective the emerging virtual and micropayment systems will be in extracting revenue directly from consumers. There will likely be many cases where companies will be able to make more by directly charging consumers very small sums on a large quantity of transactions rather than indirectly through advertising.
What about the Advertising Supply Curve?
Isn’t the logical conclusion, then, that advertising pricing will also approach zero? If advertisers pay based on page views and the marginal cost of an ad view is near zero (after all we just agreed that price approaches zero for the *same* page with content on it), how can companies charge $10, $20, or $50 for one thousand page views (CPM)?
Advertisers ultimately seek profit and use advertising to accomplish the following objectives:
(1) drive near-term purchases
(2) drive “considered” purchases like the purchase of a car by influencing the consumer’s perception with repeated messages over long periods of time
(3) increase a consumer’s willingness to pay a premium above marginal cost to improve profit margins
It’s extremely difficult to measure goals two and three. Brand advertisers aim to achieve all three goals and have various [unscientific] ways to measure performance. The majority of firms that can afford the luxury of spending without actually knowing whether there is a positive ROI are very large firms with large discretionary marketing budgets, a very small percentage of the ~40MM businesses out there. In fact, it’s such a small number that most firms deploy expensive direct sales organizations as their primary sales channel.
Direct advertisers wouldn’t mind achieving goals two and three, but focus 100% of their measurement and optimization on the first objective. These firms can reinvest profits from marketing in more marketing until acquisition costs equal profit because their spend is measurable. Consequently performance based advertising is self-funding, which helps to explain the rise of search marketing (and Google). To reach millions of customers, the self-service model is the obvious go-to-market choice.
Huge strides have been made to measure performance against goal one. In addition to using clicks as a near-term buying heuristic, Google has developed and integrated self-service tools like Google Analytics, Site Optimizer, and AdWords so that *any* advertiser can buy and determine the value of a lead from Google. By helping their customers understand the actual value of a lead, Google is putting pressure on itself and its employees to be intellectually honest. In the long term, delivering real value to customers is a good business model. Unfortunately, very few companies release paid click data the way Google does, so getting an accurate view into industry supply is a challenge. I suspect that most companies don’t even know how many leads (paid and unpaid) they are sending customers in aggregate let alone on a customer by customer basis.
Online brand advertising will be around for a long-long time. But I suspect that it will primarily be focused on advertising to audience segments based on well tested heuristics from old line media. For example, the U.S. Marines Corp. focuses on recruiting men. Advertisers have a ton of data about where various demographic groups spend their free time, and it turns out that they know that men watch and read about sports more than women. So the Marines might buy an advertisement on ESPN.com or Yahoo! Sports like they have historically with other sports media (during televised football games, in Sports Illustrated). It’s a relative weak approximation, but when it comes to brand advertising most professionals I’ve spoken with argue that it’s an order of magnitude better than other forms of online display targeting. For everything else, which is the vast majority of visits and attention on the internet, let’s assume that the right way to measure supply in the ad market is paid clicks.
The winners will be those who have the capacity to generate a massive quantity of high quality leads at a low cost. In an effort to compare the efficiency of lead generation, let’s compare Google’s price and cost per lead to Yahoo’s non-search business. I can’t find the data I need to do this well, so this is a back of the envelope analysis that is surely way off. Hopefully it will be useful for illustrative purposes and should be used for nothing more.
According to a recent Morgan Stanley research report, Google generated 11.3 billion paid leads in the first quarter of 2009; a Wall Street report I read last year suggested that Yahoo! generated 400 billion page views in one of the 1H08 quarters (vague, I know). Let’s assume that quarterly page views are up 20%, that all pages have display advertising (excludes the very efficient Yahoo! Search), that the average click-through rate for Y! display is 0.10%, and that all costs go against display.
In Table 1 I have done some back of the envelope math to approximate Google’s cost per lead versus Yahoo!’s non-search cost per lead (as a proxy for the economics of online direct versus brand advertising). Note that I estimate that Google earns revenue of only $0.49 per lead versus over $3.76 for Yahoo’s display advertising. More importantly, the fully amortized cost to Google of providing a lead is $0.30 versus ~$3 for Yahoo! As the supply of leads increases, prices will likely experience a dramatic aggregate decline. When that happens, anyone who can’t produce supply for a cost under market price will obviously find himself in a bad place. The low cost provider will expand market share as volume increases and high cost providers fade away.
Table 1: Back-of-the-Envelope Comparison of Direct vs. Display Price and Cost Position

I want to be clear that this is not an analysis of Google versus Yahoo!, but rather an attempt to articulate the importance of focusing on the economics of supply and demand of leads in the advertising market. I suspect that Yahoo’s non-search cost per lead is an order of magnitude higher than Yahoo! search leads. And all of this math is back of the envelope and almost certainly off by an order of magnitude/s. But this certainly leads me to believe that Yahoo! should hold on to their search business unless they get a *very* high price for the asset.
On the audience side there is an abundance of options for consumers. On the advertising side demand for quality leads dwarfs supply. The advertising supply and demand curves look more like Figure 1 rather than Figure 2 because most audience properties have wrongly assumed that page views are the right metric for advertisers; consequently, they have optimized to the wrong variable and have failed to develop the capacity to produce leads at sufficient volume. With limited supply and virtually infinite demand for leads we have a long way to go before the average price of leads approaches Google’s average price, let alone zero.
If you are working on a revenue model for an online business, you either need to:
(1) have a very high quality segmented audience that fits traditional brand advertising buying patterns; this usually requires cultivating content, which is hard to scale but is a known quantity by ad buyers
(2) develop the capacity to generate massive quantities of leads at a very low cost; the “next Google” will likely fit this model
(3) charge customers directly through subscriptions or virtual transactions; this is very hard to do as consumers so easily substitute one product for another (leading to a very steep demand curve in most markets)
There is no question in my mind that Google has made the world a better place for not only for consumers, but also for businesses. By focusing on driving high quality leads to their customers, they have increased the global velocity of commerce. They are earning a healthy profit, but they are likely taking a fraction of the surplus they are creating. If others follow Google’s lead our entire economy would benefit.